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Will Uncooperative Federalism Survive NFIB?
Abigail R. Moncrieff & Jonathan Dinerstein
I.

Introduction

Surveying the political landscape, one might conclude that the dominant
feature of modern federalism is the one that Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather
Gerken described in their aptly named article  of  five  years  ago,  “Uncooperative  
Federalism.”1 Our hyper-partisan era is one of matter-of-course state resistance to
national programs, with Republican governors pushing back on President
Obama’s  directives.
At first blush, the doctrinal landscape seems to support the political tide.
In NFIB v. Sebelius,2 the Supreme Court openly facilitated states’  resistance  to  
Obamacare’s  Medicaid expansion, holding that the statute may not require the
states to participate. According to the Supreme Court, the states must be free to
refuse  the  national  government’s  instruction to expand their Medicaid programs.
This  holding  looks  like  a  tremendous  victory  for  the  “uncooperative  federalism”  
model, ensuring that states can resist even the most significant of the national
government’s  priorities without threatening their participation in existing
cooperative federalism schemes.
But on closer consideration, we think that NFIB’s  Medicaid holding is
more likely to harm than help the era of uncooperative federalism—and might
harm federalism generally. We predict that, in the long run, the holding is likely
to cause more nationalization of policy decisions and policy administration. That
might seem counterintuitive given that NFIB looks like an aggressively profederalism and pro-state holding. Let us explain.
There’s  not  much  law  left  that’s  purely  states’  jurisdiction.  The  national
government has used its expansive spending power3 to touch every arena of
modern law and policy, and its money comes with strings attached. Through the
power  of  the  purse  and  the  purse’s  many  strings,  the national government today
influences how  states  exercise  all  of  their  traditional  “police  powers,”  including  
the erstwhile local realms of education,4 health,5 safety,6 and welfare.7 States
today exert  their  influence  primarily  through  efforts  to  shape  these  “cooperative  
federalism”  programs,  whether  they  do  so  cooperatively  or  uncooperatively, and
the end result is that a startling amount of policy administration happens in
negotiation between national and state governments.8 That’s  why  we  live  in  this
1

See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256
(2009).
2
132 S.Ct. 2566, 2601-08 (2012).
3
See U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 1; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
4
See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
5
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
6
See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
7
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
8
See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011).
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era of uncooperative federalism. When philosophical disagreements arise between
the controlling faction in a state and the one in the national government, there are
lots of opportunities for the state to assert itself by defying national directives.
But what happens when a state, whether intentionally in the course of
active uncooperation or innocently in the course of cooperative administration,
violates a statutory condition for the receipt of national funds? Can individuals
who are harmed by the violation force state compliance? Can the national
government enforce its statute against the state? Is  the  state’s  violation  even
illegal? As it turns out, the answers to these questions are complex and in flux,
largely  thanks  to  the  Supreme  Court’s  ambivalence  on  the  deeper  questions  of  
federalism. Given the current set of doctrinal answers from two sleeper cases,
Gonzaga University v. Doe9 and Douglas v. Independent Living Center of
Southern California,10 the answer seems to be that the state has done nothing
wrong when it violates a statutory spending condition, but the national
government has done something wrong if it acquiesces in the violation. The
burden is thus on the national government to enforce its statutory spending
conditions, and individuals can sue the national government (but not the state
government) if the national government fails to enforce.11 But after  the  Court’s  
holding in NFIB,12 such enforcement will be harder than it used to be (and might
be occasionally impossible) in any cooperative federalism program that uses
money as the enforcement tool.
Because of this odd set of difficulties that the Supreme Court has created,
the national government might need to switch to enforcement tools that do not
raise the constitutional difficulty that NFIB identified. Within the realm of
cooperative federalism, only one other tool seems to exist: conditional
preemption. Other than money, the only enforcement tool that the national
government sometimes uses in cooperative federalism programs is a crowd-out of
state administration when states fail in their enactments of national directives—
like  the  national  fallback  option  in  Obamacare’s  exchange  provision.13 After
NFIB, it will be safer and easier for Congress to use conditional preemption than
financial penalties in enacting or amending cooperative federalism programs. The
result, however, will be to substitute nationalization for uncooperative federalism.
If a state takes its resistance so far as to provoke a national crowd-out, it will lose
the power of the servant and any benefits that come from the federal structure.
We do not necessarily mean to criticize NFIB with this prediction. Indeed,
we do not necessarily think that a shift to conditional preemption would be bad
for public policy in the United States. Our greater concern is with the complex of

9

536 U.S. 273 (2002) (holding that individuals may not sue heads of state agencies under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to correct violations of federal spending conditions).
10
123 S.Ct. 1204 (2012) (holding that individuals should sue federal agencies under the
Administrative  Procedure  Act’s  arbitrary  and  capricious  standard  when  those  agencies  agree  to  
fund state programs that violate statutory spending conditions).
11
See id. (urging individuals to sue the national government under the APA).
12
Id. at 2601-08.
13
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321.
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holdings in Gonzaga, Douglas, New York v. United States,14 Printz v. United
States,15 South Dakota v. Dole,16 and NFIB and the uncomfortable position that
the Supreme Court has created for both the state and national governments. All
told,  the  Supreme  Court’s  federalism  jurisprudence  makes  little sense and might
ultimately prove self-defeating given the Supreme Court’s  stated  justifications for
its holdings.
II.

The  Supreme  Court’s  Pre-NFIB Federalism Jurisprudence

In 1992, the Supreme Court began a renewed interest in federalism
limitations—a doctrinal adoption of President  Reagan’s  “New  Federalism”—with
the justices starting to enforce constraints on national power that had lain
doctrinally dormant since the New Deal.17 The Court began with an anticommandeering doctrine in New York v. United States,18 progressed to a weak
constraint on the commerce power in United States v. Lopez,19 reinforced the anticommandeering principle in Printz v. United States,20 and reinforced the
Commerce Clause constraint in United States v. Morrison.21
Focusing only on these holdings, the New Federalism revolution seemed
to issue a relatively clear set of rules for Congress. First, if the national
government wants to regulate something through direct regulation, it has to
enforce the law itself. It cannot require state actors to implement national policy.
Functionally, this rule requires that Congress put its money where its mouth is,
ponying up national funds to enforce national regulations, and it requires the
national government to be clear with constituents about whose policy is whose,
flashing FBI badges rather than local police badges when it arrests citizens for
violating national policies. Second, these cases hold that there are some things
that Congress may not regulate through this model of purely national, direct
regulation. Non-economic and primarily local behaviors, like carrying guns near
schools,22 abusing women,23 and refusing to buy health insurance,24 are beyond
14

505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the federal government may not simply require state
legislatures to implement federal policy).
15
521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the federal government may not simply require state law
enforcement officers to implement federal policy).
16
483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that the federal government may withhold federal funding from
states that refuse to comply with federal directives as long as the funding is reasonably related to
the directives and the financial inducement is not coercive).
17
See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954)
(arguing that the Supreme Court did not need to enforce federalism constraints because the states
could protect themselves); but see Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double
Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court ought to
enforce federalism doctrines more strictly).
18
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the federal government may not simply require state
legislatures to implement federal policy).
19
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
20
521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the federal government may not simply require state law
enforcement officers to implement federal policy).
21
529 U.S. 598 (2002).
22
See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.

Congress’s  direct  regulatory  jurisdiction. So far so good. The rules are not exactly
simple, but they’re  simple enough.
The pre-NFIB New Federalism holdings, however, left  Congress’s  
Spending Power entirely intact. Most importantly, the New Deal holdings in
United States v. Butler25 and Helvering v. Davis26 survived the New  Federalism’s  
onslaught without a scratch. In Butler, the Court invalidated a portion of the
Agricultural Advancement Act, but in the process, it issued a critical holding for
the  future  of  American  federalism:  Congress’s  Spending  Power  is  a  separately  
enumerated power, which the national government may use to pursue ends other
than those otherwise granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8.27 In other words,
Butler held that Congress could use its taxing and spending power to enhance the
“general  welfare”  in  ways  other  than  those  enumerated  in  the  rest  of  the  Section 8
list.  But  the  opinion  interpreted  “general  welfare”  somewhat narrowly, keeping
the spending power relatively contained. A year later, however, came Helvering,
which held that the “discretion” to decide whether a given expenditure is for the
general welfare “belongs  to  Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a
display  of  arbitrary  power,  not  an  exercise  of  judgment.”28 This holding gave
Congress essentially unlimited authority to regulate through taxing and spending.
After Helvering, if Congress could get the votes to pass a spending statute, it
could  regulate  the  subject  of  that  statute,  irrespective  of  the  Constitution’s  
apparent attempt to reserve unenumerated substantive powers to the states.
Given these spending power holdings, the New Federalism limitations on
Congress’s  Commerce  Clause  authority  are, functionally, requirements that the
national government do some things through taxation rather than regulation.
Because Congress can tax and spend for any purpose, the Lopez and Morrison
limitation on national regulation of non-economic and local behaviors is a
limitation of form rather than substance. Congress can still set incentives for
individual non-economic behaviors, but it can do so only through its spending
power.
Of course, there are real differences between taxation and regulation. After
Lopez, for example, the national government can levy a tax against anyone who
carries a gun near a school, which might dissuade many people from doing so, but
the FBI cannot arrest and imprison those who willingly pay the tax for the
privilege.29 Furthermore, because the Child Labor Tax Case survived the New
Deal revolution, there are meaningful limitations on the heft of taxes and the
means of administering them.30 A tax ceases to be a tax—and becomes a
regulation—if the amount of the tax drastically exceeds the cost of complying
23

See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
See NFIB, 123 S.Ct. 2566.
25
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
26
301 U.S. 619 (1937).
27
297 U.S. at 65-66.
28
Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
29
There are today, and were before Congress passed the national Gun Free School Zones Act and
before Lopez was decided, many state laws against carrying guns near schools. It is only the
national government that cannot regulate this issue through direct regulation.
30
See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
24

with national policy,  if  the  tax’s  trigger  includes  a  scienter  requirement, or if the
national government sets up an administrative structure separate from the Internal
Revenue Service to determine whether an individual must pay the tax.
Nevertheless, Helvering had a real and significant impact on national power;
Article I, Section 8 no longer contains any substantive barriers to national
action.31 Whatever barriers the Court creates under the Commerce Clause are
rules of form rather than substance.
The next piece of the doctrinal federalism puzzle is Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis32 and South Dakota v. Dole,33 which survive NFIB, albeit with a
significant injury. Steward Machine and Dole, although decided five decades
apart, both held that Congress may use its expansive spending power to cajole the
states into implementing national policy. The national government may offer
money to the states that is conditioned on their implementation of national
dictates. In Steward Machine, the Supreme Court upheld a statutory scheme under
which states could relieve their citizens of national Social Security taxation only
by implementing an alternative and equally good unemployment scheme. That
statute was  the  inverse  of  today’s  prototypical  cooperative  federalism  program;;  it  
set a national regulatory default, which took money away from the states, but then
gave the states the right to opt out of the national default by replacing the national
program with equivalents of their own. In Dole, the question was whether
Congress  could  threaten  to  take  5%  of  a  state’s  preexisting  highway  funds  away  
from the state if it refused to raise the legal drinking age to 21. Again, that
structure was not the prototypical “contract”-like34 cooperative federalism scheme
in which the national government offers money to the states that is conditioned on
their willingness to implement and enforce certain policy details. But the Supreme
Court held that Congress could threaten states with a drop in their baseline
funding as long as the drop was not so traumatic that the states would feel
compelled to avoid it.
For our purposes, the punchline of these holdings is that Congress can use
the Spending Power not only to circumvent the Lopez and Morrison restrictions
on regulatory subjects but also to circumvent the New York and Printz restrictions
on commandeering state governments. The federal structure of national policies
that New York and Printz seemed to find distasteful is perfectly permissible as
long as the national government pays the states for their acquiescence.
Importantly, this holding limits the plausible justification for an anticommandeering doctrine because it allows some obfuscation of policy
responsibility. The national government can bribe state governments to become
the face of a legal regime, convincing states to flash local police badges rather
than FBI badges, as long as it pays the states to play that role. Notably, however,
31

The substantive individual rights enumerated in the bill of rights and implied in the Fifth
Amendment’s  Due  Process  Clause,  of  course,  still  constrain  national  power,  but  thanks  to  
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, they also constrain state power. Those substantive barriers
are not about federalism (though federalism may be a means of protecting the same individual
liberties that the substantive rights seek to protect).
32
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
33
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
34
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).

Dole contained a line of dictum that became the basis for the restriction in NFIB:
“Our  decisions  have  recognized  that,  in  some  circumstances,  the  financial  
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which  ‘pressure  turns  into  compulsion.’”35 In other words, the states must retain a
meaningful right to refuse this role—to refuse the acceptance of actual and
apparent responsibility for national policy implementation. That requirement
ensures that a state is, in fact, at least somewhat  responsible  for  the  policies  it’s  
enforcing because the state will have made a genuine choice to play the role of the
national  government’s  policeman.
The final piece of the doctrinal federalism puzzle is the least well-known
and the most puzzling. The New Federalism revolution has included two
“sleeper”36 cases  that  limit  the  states’  responsibility  for  complying  with  national  
policies—even after they agree to participate in cooperative federalism schemes.
In the first, Gonzaga University v. Doe,37 the Supreme Court held that § 1983—
the famous private right of action against state officials for deprivations of federal
rights38—does not provide a right of action for violations of national spending
conditions unless the conditions, by their own terms, imply such a right of
action.39 On its face, the Gonzaga opinion did not look like much of a departure
from  the  Supreme  Court’s  earlier  opinion  in  Pennhurst.40 Pennhurst had already
noted that private rights of action were not an appropriate remedy under
cooperative  federalism:  “In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power,
the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is
not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal
Government to terminate funds to the State.”41 But Gonzaga had a significant
impact  on  lower  courts’  practices, limiting the number of spending conditions that
the lower courts allowed individuals to enforce through § 1983 suits.42
Furthermore, Gonzaga reiterated and clarified  the  Supreme  Court’s  theory  that  
spending  conditions  are  not  binding  on  states’  behavior;;  they  are  essentially  
contract terms between the national and state governments, which the national
government has the power to invoke when deciding whether or not to give money
to the states.
The other sleeper case is Douglas v. Independent Living Center of
Southern California,43 which addressed the same issue of enforcing spending
conditions against noncompliant states. That case has a strange and confusing
procedural history, but the bottom line is that Justice Breyer, writing for the
35

Dole, 483 U.S. at 211, quoting Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590.
See Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwarz, Section 1983 Litigation: Supreme Court Review,
19 TOURO L. REV. 625, 663 (2003) (quoting then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who referred
to Gonzaga University v. Doe as  his  “sleeper”  case  of  the  2002  term).
37
563 U.S. 273.
38
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
39
See 563 U.S. at 282-86.
40
451 U.S. 1.
41
Id. at 28, quoted in Gonzaga, 563 U.S. at 280.
42
See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983,
and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413  (2008)  (noting  that  lower  courts  “have  
inconsistently and confusingly applied the Gonzaga framework”).
43
123 S.Ct. 1204 (2012).
36

majority in what is probably a non-precedential portion of the opinion, ended up
encouraging individuals to use Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenges to
compel national enforcement of spending conditions. His theory is that national
agencies act arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of their organic statutes and
the APA, when they disburse money  to  states  despite  the  states’  violations of
statutory conditions on funding. In other words, Justice Breyer wrote that the
national government is not only empowered but may be obliged, under the APA,
to enforce the terms of its contracts with the states.
These last two cases create a strange situation for uncooperative
federalism. Gonzaga and its predecessors were largely responsible for allowing
states the flexibility they needed to resist national directives while still
participating in federal programs—in other words, for allowing uncooperative
federalism to exist. In many of these programs, the national government has been
unwilling to use the blunt (and often perverse) instrument of withdrawing funds to
bring states into line, and individual suits under § 1983 were thus, before
Pennhurst and Gonzaga, the only functional mechanism for enforcement of
spending conditions. Once that mechanism all but disappeared, the states became
much freer to resist national directives within cooperative federalism regimes,
without much risk to their funds.
Douglas, however, creates pressure for the national government to start
using its enforcement tools to  push  back  on  states’  uncooperation.  Justice  
Breyer’s  opinion  literally  invites  individuals  to  sue  national  agencies for allowing
state resistance within cooperative federalism programs, predicting a rule under
APA arbitrary and capricious review that the national government must force
states to make a choice between their money and their principles. That rule, if it
clearly emerged from APA litigation, could have put an abrupt end to
uncooperative federalism in its most extreme form—the form that Bulman-Pozen
and  Gerken  call  “civil  disobedience”44—by making the threat of losing national
dollars much more credible than it has ever been in the past.
But  then  there’s  NFIB.
III.

NFIB’s  Doctrinal Role

NFIB complicates the picture more than clarifying it.45 In the first part of
the opinion, NFIB stands by the nonsensical division that has governed Congress
since Lopez or, really, since Butler: the things that Congress cannot accomplish by
direct regulation, it can nevertheless accomplish through taxation.46 Chief Justice
Roberts’s  compromise  to  save  Obamacare is the same compromise that has
facilitated national regulatory power since the New Deal, notwithstanding the
limitations that the constitutional framers probably had in mind and that the Court
44

See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1, at 1271-84.
123 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
46
Id. at 2584-2601 (holding that the individual mandate is not  a  valid  exercise  of  Congress’s  
power to regulate interstate commerce or of its power to enact laws that are necessary and proper
to carry out commercial regulation but going on to conclude that the mandate is a valid tax that
Congress may constitutionally impose).
45

has halfheartedly tried to resurrect in the New Federalism era. Congress holds an
unlimited (legal47) power to tax and spend.
What was new in the NFIB majority was the Medicaid holding. For the
first time, the Supreme Court gave teeth to the Dole dictum that Congress’s  
financial inducements might become so  tempting  as  to  “pass the point at which
‘pressure  turns  into  compulsion.’”48 By a vote of 7-2, the Court held that the
potential  tie  between  the  Medicaid  expansion  and  the  states’  pre-existing
Medicaid funding gave the states no choice but to accept the expansion, unduly
coercing them to enact national policy.49 In other words, the Medicaid expansion
needed to be meaningfully voluntary for the states, and by threatening states with
loss of their pre-Obamacare Medicaid funding, the national government would
make it too hard for states to refuse the expansion. The Court therefore held that
the Obama Administration may not withdraw pre-existing Medicaid funds from
states that refuse to expand.
This holding might seem sensible enough—if only it were a little less far
reaching and a lot more robustly theorized. The problem with  the  Court’s analysis
is that the move Congress made with Obamacare’s  Medicaid  expansion  is  one that
it makes all the time: it changed the statutory conditions for an existing national
grant. Furthermore, even assuming the Medicaid expansion was a new program
rather than a mere amendment to an existing one, the threat of dropping states
below their preexisting baseline of national funding if they refuse to enact a new
national policy was not new; that was what the statute in Dole had done, too. So
what, if anything, was unique about the Medicaid expansion? If the answer is
nothing, then a lot of current statutory spending conditions might be
constitutionally unenforceable.
Chief  Justice  Roberts’s  opinion,  which  spoke  for  three  justices but
represented the governing plurality, gave the following reasons for finding the
Medicaid expansion unconstitutional even though the financial punishment at
issue in Dole was not. First, he reasoned that the expansion was so different from
pre-Obamacare Medicaid that it could not be considered part of the preexisting
program.50 So far, this point fails to distinguish Dole—Chief Justice Roberts
would have to concede that, as a policy matter, expansion Medicaid was at least
as closely related to pre-expansion Medicaid as the drinking age was to highway
funding. Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts gave very few meaningful criteria for
distinguishing an amendment to an existing program from what he claims
happened here: the creation of a new program under the same statute as an
existing program.  What  he  said  was  that  the  “Medicaid  expansion  .  .  .  
accomplishes  a  shift  in  kind,  not  merely  degree”51 by abandoning eligibility
categories in favor of a blanket eligibility threshold of 133% of the Federal
Poverty Line. He  compared  that  change  to  “[p]revious  amendments  to  Medicaid  
eligibility[, which had] merely altered and expanded the boundaries of [the
47

Its political power is a different story.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211, quoting Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590.
49
See NFIB, 123 S.Ct. at 2601-08.
50
Id. at 2604-06.
51
Id. at 2605.
48

existing  eligibility]  categories.”52 What is not clear is why the abandonment of
categorical eligibility is a change of kind rather than degree while additions of
new eligibility categories, such as pregnant women (as Justice Ginsburg noted in
dissent),53 is  a  change  of  degree  rather  than  kind.  Would  Chief  Justice  Roberts’s  
analysis have gone out the window if Congress had instead amended the Medicaid
Act to say that childless adults living in or near poverty constituted a new
category of mandatory eligibility?
Chief Justice Roberts went on to say:
Under the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to
meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income
below 133 percent of the poverty level. It is no longer a program to care
for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive
national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.54
But there are serious problems with this argument. Most importantly, many of
Obamacare’s  drafters  probably  believe  that  “the  entire  nonelderly  population  with  
income  below  133  percent  of  the  poverty  level”  is, today, a perfectly apt
definition  for  “the  neediest  among  us.”  Also  importantly,  many  members  of  the  
1965 Congress (which created Medicaid) believed  that  they  were  writing  “an  
element of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance
coverage.”  They  didn’t  succeed,  but  it’s  not  at  all  clear  that  they  weren’t  trying.  If
these are the only grounds for treating the expansion as a new program, then that
treatment seems wrong; the Medicaid expansion looks like an effort to amend the
prior program so that it can better achieve its original goals. In the end, Chief
Justice  Roberts’s  first  point  fails  to  distinguish  Dole and provides tenuous (if not
simply incorrect) arguments in support of the notion that NFIB presents a Dole
case rather than a standard case of an amendment to an existing conditional grant.
The  Chief  Justice’s  next attempt to demonstrate that expansion Medicaid
is different from prior Medicaid is more successful. He noted that Congress
structured coverage differently for the expansion population than for the
preexisting population, offering a higher Federal Financial Participation
percentage and mandating lesser benefits for the expansion group.55 These
differences are more concrete as reasons to believe that Obamacare Medicaid is a
different program from—and not a mere amendment to—pre-Obamacare
Medicaid. Still, though, the point fails to distinguish Dole, which imposed a brand
new requirement on the states, largely unrelated to highway funding, at threat of
losing preexisting funds.
Chief Justice  Roberts’s  second  major  argument  is  the  one  that  mattered—
the one that successfully distinguished Dole: Medicaid puts too much money at
stake.56 In Dole, the punishment for refusing to implement the national drinking
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age was 5% of highway funding, which  amounted  to  .05%  of  South  Dakota’s  
budget at the time.57 The punishment for refusing to expand Medicaid, by
contrast,  was  (potentially)  the  state’s  entire  Medicaid  budget,  which,  as  Chief  
Justice  Roberts  noted,  “accounts  for  over  20  percent  of  the  average State’s  total  
budget.”58 To Chief Justice Roberts, this level of financial inducement “is  a  gun  to  
the  head.”59 The  Chief  Justice  concluded:  “The  threatened  loss  of  over  10  percent  
of  a  State’s  overall  budget  .  .  .  is  economic  dragooning  that  leaves  States  with no
real  option  but  to  acquiesce  in  the  Medicaid  expansion.”60
The problem with this argument is that it puts every single Medicaid
condition—or at least every single condition that was not in the statute the day the
state joined the program—at risk of unenforceability. Withdrawal of the national
portion  of  a  state’s  Medicaid  budget  is  the  only  enforcement  tool  that  the  
Medicaid Administrator has to ensure compliance with Medicaid Act conditions.
If the amount of money is the problem, then all Medicaid enforcement is
unconstitutional.
The most charitable (and probably correct) understanding of the Chief
Justice’s  opinion  is  that  both  features need to be present for enforcement to be
unconstitutional: the national government must impose (or threaten to impose) (1)
an enormous financial penalty for (2) refusal to implement a brand new policy (as
distinct from an amendment to an existing policy). If that is the right
understanding of the NFIB plurality’s  holding, then perhaps the other provisions
of the Medicaid Act—even the conditions that Congress added to the statute after
the states opted in—are safe from constitutional attack despite their newness to
the statute and despite the potential financial gravity of their enforcement.
Unfortunately,  however,  the  Chief  Justice’s  rules  for  what  constitutes  a  brand  new  
program are so unclear that it will be hard for future courts to figure out which
post-1965 statutory amendments are and are not constitutionally enforceable.61
The dissenters’  opinion62—which added four votes to the holding that the
Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional—engaged in importantly different
analysis. First, the  dissenters  thought  it  mattered  that  a  given  state’s  citizens  
would have to pay for the Medicaid expansion whether they agreed to join or
not.63 Because the national portion  of  a  state’s  Medicaid program comes from the
nation as a whole, not just the citizens of the participating state, national grants to
states create a collective action problem that (eventually) coerces all states to get
with  the  program.  As  each  state  joins,  all  states’  taxes  rise,  until  the  marginal  cost  
of joining feels negligible.64
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If this argument had been decisive, then Medicaid should have been
unconstitutional in 1965, and all of Medicaid should be unconstitutional today.
When Arizona became the last state to join the program in 1982, its citizens were
already paying for Medicaid programs throughout the rest of the country.
According  to  the  dissent’s  logic,  Arizonans  had not meaningfully avoided paying
for the national policy65; they had only avoided administering that policy within
their borders.
Fortunately, the dissenters do not seem to have taken this argument
particularly seriously. They  immediately  went  on  to  say:  “Whether  federal  
spending legislation crosses the line from enticement to coercion is often difficult
to determine, and courts should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional on
this ground unless  the  coercive  nature  of  an  offer  is  unmistakably  clear.”66
Thereafter,  the  dissent’s  analysis  tracks Chief  Justice  Roberts’s argument that the
heft of the potential penalty is what mattered in this case.67 The feature of the
Medicaid expansion that made the difference for the dissenters was the size and
consequence of the financial penalty for failure to expand. Medicaid is too
significant a source of states’  revenues and expenditures for the national
government to threaten to take it away.
The  dissenters’  analysis,  however,  did  not  seem  to  include Chief Justice
Roberts’s  point that the expansion was a different program from pre-Obamacare
Medicaid. They seemed to believe that any threat of withdrawing national
Medicaid funding would be an unconstitutionally coercive means of enforcing
compliance with national directives, whether those directives were part of the
original Medicaid program or not.
As noted above, that view, if it ever carried a majority on the Court, would
make the vast majority of Medicaid Act conditions entirely impossible to enforce.
There are few Medicaid conditions that individuals can enforce through § 1983
actions after Gonzaga, and the dissents’  constitutional  analysis  would  forbid  the  
Medicaid Administrator from using her one and only enforcement tool—
withdrawal of funds—to enforce conditions, no matter how many APA suits got
filed against her after Douglas.
Medicaid programs, adding another $150 million for a program of your own might not seem so
bad. See NFIB at Roberts opinion p. 51, noting that the national government will spend $3.3
trillion between 2010-19 on Medicaid. Our numbers  are  $3.3  trillion/50  for  each  state’s  nine-year
share,  divided  by  9  for  each  state’s  annual share ($7 billion). We then divided that share by 50 to
figure out how much each state pays in national taxes for a marginal state to join. This math is a
rough approximation of a state average; different  states’  programs  cost  different  amounts,  both  
because  the  programs’  eligibility  and  benefits  differ  and  because  the  national  government’s  
percentage share differs.
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IV.

NFIB’s  Practical  Consequence

The final vote in NFIB’s  Medicaid  holding is 4-3-2, with 7 justices finding
the mandatory Medicaid expansion unconstitutional. Unfortunately, however, the
divided opinion leaves tremendous uncertainty as to what made the expansion
unconstitutional. The size of Medicaid and its importance to state budgets were
undoubtedly key. Does that mean that the holding is unique to Medicaid, which is
the biggest or second-biggest  line  item  in  every  state’s  budget?  Or  will  other  
programs look equally big and important when states bring challenges in other
cooperative federalism contexts?68 For future challenges, will it matter whether a
condition  that’s  being  enforced  is  a  part of the preexisting program or is, instead,
a different kind of program that’s  been  added  to  the  same  statute? How will courts
know which new conditions are new programs and which are amendments to
existing programs? In short, the NFIB opinion is troublingly confused and
confusing.
One thing, however, is clear: For the first time in American history, the
Supreme  Court  has  enforced  a  ceiling  on  Congress’s  power  to  financially  induce
state administration of national policy. And the certainty that this Court—
including two of its liberal appointees—is sometimes willing to enforce such a
ceiling,  combined  with  the  uncertainty  as  to  the  ceiling’s  breadth  and  contours,  
will provide the states with an unusually large bargaining chip in uncooperative
federalism negotiations.
This point is key. Even if the Supreme Court never again enforced its new
constraint on spending conditions, the NFIB holding, particularly combined with
Justice Breyer’s  Douglas suggestion to enforce spending conditions through APA
litigation, could dramatically impact cooperative federalism programs. Most
federal policy administration does not happen through statutes or courts; it
happens in negotiation between national and state agencies, contained entirely
within the Fourth Branch.69 When a state wants to change its Medicaid program,
it approaches the national Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
with  a  State  Plan  Amendment  and  seeks  CMS’s  blessing  to  move forward, with
the  state’s  matching funds secure. Before NFIB, the state agent in that context
knew that outright noncompliance with Medicaid Act conditions could result
(even if it never actually had resulted) in a severe financial penalty. CMS had the
threat of its § 1396c power to withdraw national money from all or part of the
state’s  Medicaid  program,  and  that  possibility  kept  negotiations  relatively  civil.  
After NFIB, however, a recalcitrant (or cash-strapped and desperate) state agent
could dare her national counterparts to try withdrawal of funding, threatening
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constitutional litigation if national bureaucrats called the bluff. Imagine, for
example, a state Medicaid administrator who wants to cause trouble for the sitting
President, or a state administrator that simply does not have enough money to pay
for rising Medicaid costs and wants to slash the program in contravention of
Medicaid Act directives. Such an administrator might be willing to push a lot
harder against CMS in the shadow of NFIB than she ever would have dared to
push before the shadow was cast. Meanwhile, CMS knows that if it doesn’t  do  
something to enforce Medicaid Act requirements, it is likely to face an APA suit
for arbitrarily and capriciously approving a State Plan Amendment that violates
the national statute. But what can it do? Its only enforcement tool might be
unconstitutional.
In short, given  the  uncertain  basis  for  the  Supreme  Court’s  holding,  
national bureaucrats will have lost a significant amount of their bargaining power
in federal administrative negotiations, at least in those programs that rely on
money for inducement and enforcement.
V.

Non-Financial Enforcement?

So far, our analysis seems to indicate that NFIB has increased rather than
decreased state power in cooperative federalism programs, perhaps allowing the
states even greater leverage to behave uncooperatively. They now have a
powerful threat of their own that they can use to counterbalance the national
agency’s  threat of withdrawing funding: a constitutional challenge to agency
action. But remember that the Supreme Court, in the same term as NFIB, told
private litigants that they could and should force national agencies to enforce their
statutes. In Douglas, Justice Breyer invited APA litigation against CMS for its
approval of a state plan that violated a provision of the Medicaid Act. If private
stakeholders  accept  Justice  Breyer’s  invitation,  then  national  agencies  will  not  be  
able  to  surrender  under  the  state  bureaucrats’  threat  of  constitutional  litigation.
They will have to show some serious attempt to force state compliance with
statutory conditions,70 and they will not be allowed to permit the kind of
uncooperative federalism that arises from political disagreement.71
This situation could devolve quickly. A serious threat of financial
enforcement from national agencies will provoke constitutional litigation under a
standard that defies simple line-drawing,  but  the  national  agencies’  failure  to  
enforce will provoke administrative law litigation under a standard that invites
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judicial intermeddling. The question, then, is whether Congress could give
national agencies some other enforcement tool that would avoid NFIB’s  
constitutional morass. Is there another tool that Congress could give CMS that
would enable it to avoid both constitutional litigation from states and APA
litigation from private stakeholders?
Indeed, Congress seems to have exactly two mechanisms for encouraging
state implementation of national policy: conditioning national money72 and
conditionally pre-empting state action with national regulation (crowding-out
state administration).73 Some cooperative programs use a mix of these two
strategies,74 but these two mechanisms appear to be the only two in existence
today. Both financial incentives and conditional preemption allow state legislators
and residents to make a choice regarding their involvement in national policy,
thereby complying with the anti-commandeering constraint,75 but the programs
that rely on financial penalties facilitate greater policy discretion for the states
than those that allow conditional preemption.
Typically, if a state chooses to forgo national funding in a cooperative
federalism program, it can entirely avoid the implementation of the national
policy within its borders.  Arizona’s  refusal  to  implement  Medicaid from 19651982, for example, meant that there was no Medicaid program operating in the
state during that time, which might have been Arizonans’ goal. Similarly,
Wyoming’s  willingness  to  suffer  the  5%  reduction in highway funding allowed it
to maintain a drinking age of 18 until 1988, when it became the last state to join
the national Drinking Age Act of 1984. Puerto Rico still enforces a drinking age
of 18, choosing to forgo 10% of its highway funding so that it can keep its
preferred policy.
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By contrast, a conditional preemption mechanism does not allow the state
or its residents to avoid the existence of a national program in the state. When the
state refuses to implement the national program, the national government steps
into  the  state’s  borders  to  administer  the  program  itself.  Conditional  preemption  
thus allows the state to avoid only the responsibility for implementing a program.
The state government does not get drafted  into  the  national  government’s  service,  
but  the  state’s  citizens  do not avoid the imposition of national policy.
For example, consider the health insurance exchanges under Obamacare,
which use a conditional preemption mechanism.76 The statute requires states to
establish compliant exchanges by a set date, but it provides that, if the state
refuses or fails by the deadline, then the national government will establish an
exchange  on  the  state’s  behalf.  The  thirty-four states that refused to establish their
own exchanges, thus, have not kept exchanges out of their borders. They have
escaped the responsibility for running the exchanges, and they have perhaps
maintained a clearer line of responsibility than the states that are running
exchanges of their own. But they have not shielded their citizens from the national
policy.
For another example, consider the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA). RCRA features a conditional preemption enforcement mechanism
rather than conditional funding. Congress sought to regulate solid and hazardous
waste through three methods: national agency enforcement through the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), regulation through approved state
programs, and citizen suit enforcement.77 States can regulate solid and hazardous
waste under RCRA only if EPA approves their plan.78 States that want a greater
degree of control over waste management have an incentive to create an EPAapproved plan so that they can implement  Congress’s policy themselves rather
than triggering the conditional preemption provision by which EPA takes over
full implementation responsibility. But, under this scheme, no state can avoid the
implementation of some nationally-regulated waste management plan within its
borders. Its choices are between a cooperative program and a national program. It
cannot avoid the policy in its entirety the way that a state could under a standard
conditional grants program.
As noted above, the NFIB ruling strains Congress’s  ability  to  condition  
national funding on states’  implementation of regulatory policies. Without clear
rules for when conditional  funding  “passes  the  point  at  which  ‘pressure  turns  into  
compulsion,’”79 the national government might be hesitant to use money as the
primary enforcement mechanism in future cooperative programs, and Congress
might become tempted to turn to conditional preemption even in existing
cooperative programs. In short, the holding might have a profound impact on the
national  government’s  choices  about  how  to  manage  cooperative  federalism.
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That said, national agencies have occasionally been hesitant to use their
conditional preemption authority just as they have usually been hesitant to use
financial penalties. Currently, for example, EPA has authority to take direct
regulatory control under the Clean Water Act (CWA) if states fail to meet
national standards. The EPA, however, has a lot of practical constraints that
prevent it from using this authority, including the lack of necessary personnel to
take over CWA enforcement in a state.80 Indeed, in general, state agencies are
better-equipped than national agencies for the day-to-day administration of these
complex policies. Historically, national agencies have capitulated to state
demands rather than developing the infrastructure required to take over
administrative responsibilities from the states.
If, however, our prediction about Douglas’s  impact  comes  to    fruition,  
requiring the national government to enforce spending conditions, and if
nationalization becomes a more common enforcement mechanism in light of
NFIB, then the national government will overcome its practical obstacles out of
necessity. Congress and the national agencies will predict the need for conditional
preemption in new cooperative federalism schemes, and they will find the
resources they need to implement national programs (or will decrease national
regulation to conserve resources). Consider, for example, Medicare. The entirely
national Medicare program demonstrates that practical barriers to nationalization
in Medicaid are far from insurmountable and could, in fact, disappear if duly
anticipated. Given time, the same may be true across the catalogue of cooperative
federalism programs. Furthermore, although some agencies may be loath to take
on additional administrative burdens, they are certainly no more hesitant to use
conditional preemption than they have been to use withdrawal of funding.
Withdrawal of funding is ultimately a perverse enforcement tool, making perfect
the enemy of the good. A state that is doing some positive work along national
policy lines—while violating many national policy directives—is better than a
state that cannot afford to do anything at all.
In the end, we predict that, over a long timescale and assuming no
dramatic amendments to prevailing Supreme Court doctrine, Douglas and NFIB
will push the national government to greater use of conditional preemption for
enforcing spending conditions. This result might be good for national policy, but
it will leave the states with less freedom to resist, avoid, or influence national
policy. It will, in short, end uncooperative federalism by eliminating state
involvement in states that disagree with national programs.
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VI.

Normative Thoughts

In  the  end,  the  Supreme  Court’s  pronouncements  on  federalism  doctrine  
have created a strange set of incentives for the national government, and the
Court’s  rules  might push Congress and the Fourth Branch away from financial
penalties and towards their only alternative, conditional preemption, for enforcing
spending conditions. Such a swing would mark a significant blow for
uncooperative federalism. When the national government withdraws funds to
enforce spending conditions, the state retains power over the policy regime. The
state might become cash-strapped or desperate, but it is still in charge of shaping
and administering policy. When the national government uses conditional
preemption, though, the state loses all of its powers within that regime, whether
those powers were fully sovereign or not before the national takeover. The
various  “powers  of  the  servant”  that  Bulman-Pozen and Gerken identified
disappear, and the state reverts to a regular outsider in the shaping of policy.81 It
still has the power of a lobbyist, trying to convince the national government to run
its policy in particular ways, but it lacks the power of either sovereign or servant.
All of that said, there might be many advantages to this trend, should it
emerge. Uncooperative federalism has significant drawbacks, and those
drawbacks might gradually disappear if the national government starts crowding
out defiant states and mandating true cooperation of the states that want to stay
involved in federal programs. Consider the theoretical arguments of functional
federalism. Functional federalism argues that the national government should be
in charge when uniformity, redistribution among states, or economies of scale are
important or when the national government needs to prevent spillovers or a race
to the bottom among the states. By contrast, the theory argues that the states
should be in charge when experimentation, voice, exit, or diversity is important or
when we want regulation to occur only during times of economic growth (when
the states can afford to regulate without violating their balanced budget
requirements). Cooperative federalism allows some combining of these virtues of
national and state regulation respectively. Under cooperative federalism
programs, the national government engages in financial redistribution among the
states and sets a regulatory floor to ensure basic uniformity, but it allows state
experimentation, diversity, voice, and exit in regulating above the floor.
The problem with uncooperative federalism—for all that it might enhance
deliberation—is that it undermines the virtues of national involvement. Imagine
that spending conditions in a particular program are carefully designed to
optimize the balance between national and state regulation. Imagine, that is, that
the conditions are all necessary to create needed uniformity, to avoid interstate
spillovers, or to prevent races to the bottom. In this hypothetical cooperative
federalism regime, there are no superfluous or gratuitous spending conditions. By
hypothesis, then, each and every spending condition is needed to counteract an
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incentive that the states would face in the absence of the national statute:
incentives to create inefficient disuniformity, to engage in a race to the bottom, or
to externalize regulatory costs onto neighboring states. That’s  the  idea  of  efficient  
regulation. In the era of uncooperative federalism—in which spending condition
enforcement is relatively difficult and rare—the states have had tremendous
license to take national money while continuing to regulate in ways that are, by
this hypothesis, inefficient. If the national government could engage in efficient
enforcement of its efficient regulations, then cooperative federalism would strike
an impressive federalism balance.
If, however, the national government shifts to a conditional preemption
enforcement tool, then the virtues of state involvement might disappear. Imagine
again a cooperative federalism program that Congress has designed carefully to
optimize efficiency, but this time, consider the absences of national regulation. A
well-designed scheme of cooperative federalism leaves states with flexibility in
those areas of the federalism program that benefit most from experimentation,
diversity, voice, and exit—the  states’  strengths. If the national government shifts
from non-enforcement or financial enforcement to conditional preemption, its
takeover from the states could undermine or obliterate those virtues of state
involvement. Although the national government might be able to run slightly
different programs in different states after a crowd-out technique of
nationalization, thereby maintaining some experimentation and diversity values,
the voice value will all but disappear. The voice advantage of state power hinges
entirely  on  the  smallness  of  the  governmental  entity  that’s  in  charge.  If  the  
national government is in charge in a particular state, it will be very difficult for
the  state’s  citizens  to  influence  the  shaping  of  policy.
To evaluate normatively the future that we predict will emerge from the
Supreme  Court’s  interventions,  we  would  want  to  know  whether  the  cost  of  losing  
the  states’ strength with respect to citizen participation and voice will outweigh
the costs that the system has been incurring from weak enforcement of spending
conditions.82 We, the authors of this article, suspect that the cost of uncooperative
federalism is higher than the cost of nationalization, so we are relatively happy
with  the  Supreme  Court’s  odd  and  seemingly internally contradictory set of
decisions. But the normative question is a difficult empirical one that depends to
some  extent  on  citizens’  feelings  about  their  state  and  national  governments.  
Some citizens might be quite unhappy with the loss of voice that accompanies
nationalization, whether that loss is real or merely perceived.
VII.

Conclusion

In  the  end,  the  Supreme  Court’s  federalism  jurisprudence  seems  to  run  
contrary to its stated goals. The New Federalism era, up to and including NFIB,
creates an incentive for the national government to flex its own muscles more, not
less.  Maybe  that  result  will  be  good  for  voters’  clarity  and  for  uniformity  of  
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national  policy,  but  it  is  not  good  for  uncooperative  federalism  or  for  states’  
autonomy—the values that the Supreme Court seems to be trying to protect.

